
Book 



MILITARY STRATEGY VERSUS DIPLOMACY 

IN BISMARCK'S TIME AND AFTERWARDS 



BY 

MUNROE SMITH 

PROFESSOR OF JURISPRUDENCE, COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY 
)CTOR OF LAWS, COLUMBIA, GOTTINGEN AND LOUVAIN UNIVERSITIES 



REPRINTED FROM POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY 
Vol. XXX, No. i, March, 1915 



NEW YORK 
PUBLISHED BY GINN & COMPANY 
19*5 



MILITARY STRATEGY VERSUS DIPLOMACY 

IN BISMARCK'S TIME AND AFTERWARDS 



BY 

MUNROE SMITH 

PROFESSOR OF JURISPRUDENCE, COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY 
DOCTOR OF LAWS, COLUMBIA, GOTTINGEN AND LOUVAIN UNIVERSITIES 



REPRINTED FROM POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY 
Vol. XXX, No. i, March, 1915 



NEW YORK 
PUBLISHED BY GINN & COMPANY 

1915 



9 



Transferred from 
Libra ria o s O f 

MAR 23 1915 



MILITARY STRATEGY VERSUS DIPLOMACY 



IN BISMARCK'S TIME AND AFTERWARD 1 

IT is the purpose of this paper to compare the conduct of 
Austro-German diplomacy before the outbreak of the 
present war with that of Prussian and German diplomacy 
in the Bismarckian period ; and, in so far as the more recent 
diplomacy appears to have been less successful than the earlier, 
to indicate what seems to have been one of the principal ob- 
stacles to its success. 

It would be a grateful as well as an easy task to treat this 
subject from an idealistic and humanitarian point of view, and 
to assume that it is the duty of governments to render war im- 
possible. Such a discussion, however, would leave us where we 
started, in a world not yet realized. War persistently recurs, 
and in certain contingencies it seems to be unavoidable. In 
the existing world-order the first duty of the statesman is 
to protect the interests of his own country, and his action is 
to be judged, neither by pacificist nor militarist theories, but 
according to the standards of approved political practice. 

I shall hardly be accused of adopting a Utopian standard 
for the conduct of international politics if I base my criticism 
mainly on the practice and doctrines of Prince Bismarck. 
Some modern German writers have remarked that the more 
pacific theories of this statesman, formulated for the most part 
after 1871, are not in harmony with his foreign policy before 
that time. If, however, we note certain distinctions upon which 
he himself insisted, his practice and his doctrines do not appear 
to be inconsistent. 

I 

Bismarck held that a state may rightly make war for the 
realization or defense of vital national interests, but that it should 

1 The substance of this paper was presented to the Phi Beta Kappa Society of New 
York, December 14, 1914, and to the Century Association of New York, February 
?3i 1915. 

37 



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POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY [Vol. XXX 



not make war solely to increase its power, much less to preserve 
or augment its prestige. The wars which Prussia waged under 
Bismarck's political guidance, particularly the war against Aus- 
tria in 1866, unquestionably increased Prussia's power, but he 
invariably defended these wars on the ground that they were 
necessary for the establishment of German national unity. In 
his memoirs he tells us that in 1863 the Emperor Alexander II 
of Russia proposed to Prussia an offensive alliance against 
Austria, and that he advised against the acceptance of this offer. 
He explains that, if the alliance had been accepted, 

we should, in such case, have waged a Prussian war of conquest, but 
the sinews of Prussia's national policy would have been cut. In the 
effort to give to the German nation, through unity, the possibility of 
an existence corresponding to its historical importance lay the weight- 
iest argument for justifying the German "fratricidal war." If the 
struggle between the German peoples had been resolved upon solely in 
the interest of strengthening the separate state of Prussia, the renewal of 
such a war would have been inevitable. 1 

In Bismarck's speeches and writings he frequently distin- 
guishes between a policy that aims to realize or defend national 
interests (Interessenpolitik) and one which aims at power 
(Machtpolitik) , and he consistently employs the latter term as 
one of censure. " Working for prestige " (auf Prestige wirt- 
schaften) is a phrase which he often uses, and which carries 
a still stronger note of censure. 2 

1 Gedanken und Erinnerungen (one-volume edition), p. 419; Bismarck, The Man 
and the Statesman, vol. ii, pp. 76, 77. In following notes the German version of 
this work is cited as " Memoirs" and the English as " translation." The translations 
in this paper are by the writer. 

2 What Bismarck would have thought of the promotion of Kultur as a justifi- 
cation of any policy may perhaps be inferred from his protest against calling the in- 
ternal struggle between Prussia and the Roman Catholic Church a Kulturkampf, 
" We are not contending," he said, " for Kultur ', but for the political interests of 
Prussia and Germany." 

French as well as English writers have abandoned the effort to find an equivalent 
for Kultur. The word is of course broader than our "culture," but not identical 
in meaning with our " civilization." The German philosopher, Eucken, throws some 
light on the difference. He declares that our civilization is "external" and rests on 
" subjugation to forms." This, he maintains, should be complemented by an '* in- 
ternal" civilization which springs from the spirit. Granting both the truth and the 



No. i] MILITARY STRATEGY VERSUS DIPLOMACY 



Even if a war seems adapted to promote national interests, 
the statesman must of course consider the importance of the 
interests to be subserved and the chances of victory. In 
modern European conditions the latter question is not to be an- 
swered by considering solely the military strength and economic 
resources of the single country and of its immediate adversary ; 
there must be consideration also of alliances and of neutralities. 
It is here that the special task of diplomacy begins. It is the 
business of the diplomatist to make sure that his country shall 
not be brought into conflict with a coalition of superior power. 
In the condition of latent war in which Europe has been living 
for centuries, the problem of alliances is a perpetual one. In 
the continuous peril of open war in which Europe has lived 
during the last half-century, this problem is of special import- 
ance. Alliances are arranged in advance, and for terms of 
years, even when war is not in sight. When war is in sight, 
the diplomatist has to assure himself that his allies will recog- 
nize their treaty obligations ; he has to detach, if possible, the 
enemy's allies from active support of the hostile cause ; and he 
must seek to gain the moral if not the material support of prob- 
ably neutral states. He must make sure, at all events, that 
none of these probably neutral states shall join forces with the 
enemy. If he cannot achieve these results, if he is not reason- 
ably assured that superior or at least equal force will be on his 
side — and on this point he is not justified in hoping or guess- 
ing — it is his clear duty, at any sacrifice except that of the 
national honor, to strive to avert the war or at least to postpone 
it as long as possible. And he must not confuse with true 
honor the sham honor known as prestige. The line of distinc- 
tion is undoubtedly a narrow one, but he must strive to observe 
it. It was this line that Thiers tried to draw when, on July 
15, 1870, he told the French ministry and his fellow deputies 
that France was going to war " on a question of sensitiveness." 

nobility of this doctrine, it may be pointed out that it lends itself easily to dangerous 
misconstruction and misapplication. In the average mind a conviction of the supe- 
riority of spirit over form may beget an undervaluation of forms that have an 
ethical content of the highest value; and such undervaluation may lead to disregard. 
This peril is inherent in every system of individualistic or specifically national moral- 
ity, because individual or national interest is apt to produce conviction of right. 



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POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY [Vol. XXX 



The diplomatist has also to see to it that his country shall 
not appear to be responsible for the outbreak of war. In spite 
of the periodical recurrence of war throughout human history, 
and in spite of the fact that war brings out, with some of the 
basest traits of human nature, also many of the noblest, the 
great majority of civilized human beings regard it as abnormal 
and evil. In some cases it may be regarded as a necessary 
evil, or as the lesser or least of two or more threatened evils, 
but it is not generally recognized as good in itself. There has 
indeed always been an opposite theory ; eloquent voices have 
always been raised in praise of war; but in modern times at 
least such praise finds no general echo even in periods of peace, 
and when war comes its laudation excites resentment. 

In the common opinion, responsibility for war attaches pri- 
marily to the aggressor. An aggressive war may be justifiable, 
but the burden of proof is on the aggressor. The most obvious 
justification of aggressive war is to be found in the adversary's 
breach of a treaty. No nation can be bound perpetually by a 
treaty that contravenes its interests ; but if the treaty secures 
important interests of the other contracting party, its repudia- 
tion gives the latter a formal right to declare war. And it is 
not regarded as correct practice to denounce a treaty without 
previous negotiation, much less to break a treaty by aggressive 
military action. It is hardly too much to say that this latter 
course is generally regarded as immoral. 

A striking evidence of the sanctity with which treaties are 
clothed in general opinion is to be found in the fact that a 
nation is not only thought to be entitled to declare war if its 
ally be attacked, but is deemed to act dishonorably if it does 
not fulfil its treaty obligation. 

Even if the diplomatist does not share the general prejudice 
against aggression or the general feeling regarding the obliga- 
tion of treaties, the fact that these sentiments are general obliges 
him to take them into account. In fact, they always are taken 
into account, if not in the negotiations which precede a war, at 
least upon the outbreak of hostilities. At this last moment, 
each belligerent government invariably seeks to persuade its 
own people and the world at large that its cause is just. 



No. i] MILITARY STRATEGY VERSUS DIPLOMACY 



The political advantages of the defensive position are obvious. 
An attacking nation, according to the expert testimony of Bis- 
marck, will not fight at the outset with the same spirit and fire 
as a nation attacked. War is barbarism, and a nation at war 
readily reverts to the attitude of the barbarous community, which 
presents an extraordinary uniformity and solidity of feeling and 
of opinion ; but this reversion is more rapid and more universal 
in a nation attacked than in a nation attacking. As Bismarck 
puts it : 

If our ordained authorities regard the war as necessary and have declared 
it, it will be carried on with all our fighting edge, and perhaps to victory, 
as soon as our men have come under fire and seen blood. But there 
will not be behind it the same vim and fire as in a war in which we are 
attacked. 1 

Among nations not primarily involved, there is always sym- 
pathy with the nation assailed and prejudice against the nation 
that appears to be the aggressor, unless it is clear that the 
latter has just cause for war. Accordingly, the duty of the 
diplomatist to keep his country free from the semblance of 
aggression is closely connected with the problem of securing 
outside support and averting a hostile coalition. International 
alliances are seldom by their terms offensive : as a rule they 
stipulate for support only against attack. If there be doubt 
which of the original belligerents has been guilty of aggression, 
the first overt act of hostility or of grave provocation may be 
decisive. It is especially likely to be decisive if the allied 
country is under a form of government in which the action of 
the executive is largely determined by public opinion. Much 
the same may be said as regards nations not previously in alli- 
ance with either of the original antagonists. If the interests of 
any such nation tend to draw it to one side or to the other, it 
will be somewhat less likely to support the aggressor than to 
intervene on the side of the nation attacked. This probability, 

1 Speech of February 6, 1888. If this statement is open to any criticism, it is that 
it fails to note the possibility that a nation may accept, without evidence or even 
against evidence, the assurance of its "ordained authorities" that the adversary is 
the aggressor. 



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POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY [Vol. XXX 



also, increases in direct proportion to the influence of public 
opinion upon governmental action. 

To sum up : what the diplomatist gains by maintaining the 
defensive attitude is not only the more rapid development of 
the fighting spirit in his own country, but also the greater prob- 
ability that the alliances of his country will hold while those of 
his adversary will not, and that states not in alliance with either 
belligerent will support his country if their interests may 
thereby be promoted, and will remain neutral although their 
interests tend to draw them to the adversary's side. These 
advantages are indicated and the corresponding disadvantages 
of aggression are summed up in Bismarck's famous saying : 
" If we attack, the whole weight of the imponderables, which 
weigh much heavier than material weights, will be on the side 
of the adversaries whom we have attacked." 1 

One further consideration, already indicated, should perhaps 
be stated. Contemporary judgment regarding responsibility for 
war is necessarily based on the record. It takes cognizance 
only of notorious facts and of allegations that can be proved. 
This judgment may be erroneous. It may be reversed by history. 
For the diplomatist, however, it is not the ultimate verdict of 
history but the immediate verdict of contemporary opinion 
that is of importance. 2 In his appreciation of the value of the 
obvious inference as compared with the elusive fact, he does 
not lack philosophical support. Even before pragmatism was 
formulated, Wordsworth 3 wrote 

Assent is power, belief the soul of fact. 

1 Speech of February 6, 1888. 

2 Bismarck makes this point in his cynically frank story of the editing of the Ems 
dispatch. After reading the condensed version to Moltke and Roon, and explaining 
that it would have " the effect of a red rag upon the Gallic bull," he went on to say: 
" Success, however, depends essentially upon the impressions that are produced in 
our own and in other countries by the origin of the war; it is important that we be 
the ones attacked." Memoirs, p. 440; translation, vol. ii, p. 101. Doubts expressed 
by German historians regarding this Bismarck-Moltke-Roon conference do not here 
concern us. It is quite sufficient for our present purposes that Bismarck claimed to 
have made the statement cited. 

3 Memorials of a Tour in Italy. IV : At Rome — Regrets — In allusion to Niebuhr 
and other modern historians. 



No. i] MILITARY STRATEGY VERSUS DIPLOMACY 43 

II 

With Bismarck as its premier and minister of foreign affairs, 
Prussia waged three wars. In each instance Bismarck was reason- 
ably sure of his alliances and of his neutralities : in none of 
these wars was his country confronted by a hostile coalition of 
superior force. In the war against Denmark (1864), Prussia 
had the support of Austria, and no other power intervened. 
In the Austro-Prussian war (1866), Austria was supported by 
the majority of the smaller German states, but Prussia had the 
assistance of Italy. Prussia was also assured of the friendly 
neutrality of Russia, and Bismarck was reasonably certain that, 
at least at the outset, France would remain neutral. In the war 
against France (1870) Prussia had all the smaller German states 
on its side, and Russia had promised to prevent Austria from 
aiding France. 

In each of these wars Prussia's adversary either had broken a 
fairly recent treaty or was chargeable with the first overt act of 
aggression. In each case, accordingly, Prussia's position was 
correct, on the face of the record. Denmark had violated in 
1863 a treaty concluded with Prussia and Austria in 1852. Den- 
mark's action impaired important German interests, because it 
undertook, contrary to its promises, to incorporate the German 
inhabitants of Schleswig in the Danish state. In 1866 Austria 
had broken the Treaty of Gastein, concluded between Austria 
and Prussia in 1865. Austria indeed accused Prussia of breaking 
this treaty, but the Austrian breach preceded the Prussian. 
Austria also was chargeable with the first overt act of hostility 
in demanding that the German Confederation should employ 
military force against Prussia. It was tolerably clear at the time 
that Prussia was really forcing Austria into war, but on the face 
of the record Austria was the aggressor. In 1870, after the 
withdrawal of the Hohenzollern candidacy for the throne of 
Spain, the French foreign minister demanded guaranties for the 
future. Ollivier, who was at the time the French prime minis- 
ter, says that this demand could be interpreted only as intended 
to bring on war. 1 Bismarck published the French demand and 



3 Ollivier, The Franco -Prussian War, translated by G. B. Ives (1912), pp. 224, 225. 



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POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY [Vol. XXX 



King William's refusal, and France declared war. We know 
today that Bismarck had promoted the Spanish candidacy. We 
know further, that the French demand for guaranties would 
probably have been dropped, in consequence of the remonstran- 
ces of neutral powers, if Bismarck had not cut off this line of 
retreat by the form in which he published the news of the 
French demand and of its refusal. This, as he intended, made 
it impossible for the French government to retreat from its ill- 
chosen position without loss of prestige. In the light of our 
present knowledge, responsibility for that war cannot be placed 
wholly on either party. War was desired on both sides of the 
Rhine. At the time, however, it seemed clear that France was 
the aggressor and that Germany was waging a purely defensive 
war. 

In none of the wars conducted under Bismarck's diplomatic 
guidance was Prussia assured of British neutrality. Bismarck 
made no effort to secure definite pledges, because under the 
British parliamentary system a government has no power 
formally to commit the country to war or to peace. Here, 
accordingly, the immediate reaction of public opinion was of 
the highest importance, and the formal correctness of the Prus- 
sian^position in each war was of great value. In 1 864 Great 
Britain sympathized with Denmark. It was not in the British 
interest that any portion of the coast of the North Sea should 
pass out of the control of a small state into that of a great state. 
Denmark, however, refused to recognize its treaty obligations ; 
Prussia was supported by Austria; and Great Britain could 
secure no continental support against this combination. Great 
Britain accordingly gave Denmark only diplomatic support. In 
1 866 no British interest was at stake in the war between the 
two leading German powers, and, as between Austria and Italy, 
British sympathy was with Italy. In 1870 no British interest 
seemed to be involved in the struggle between Germany and 
France. And even if British interests had been involved, it 
would have been difficult for the British government to find any 
decent pretext for war. Not only did Bismarck cheerfully 
pledge observance of Belgian neutrality, but, shortly after the 
outbreak of the war, he published the draft of an unratified 



No. i] 



MILITARY STRATEGY VERSUS DIPLOMACY 



45 



treaty between France and Prussia providing, in certain con- 
tingencies, for the annexation of Belgium by France ; and he 
invited the representatives of the powers in Berlin to satisfy 
themselves, by inspection of the manuscript, that the draft was 
in the handwriting of the French ambassador, M. Benedetti. 
The effect upon British opinion was all that Bismarck could de- 
sire. It should be added that, in proportion as it became clear 
that Prussia was solving the problem of German unity, the 
public opinion of the world, fully convinced of the legitimacy 
of the principle of nationality, became increasingly favorable to 
the Prussian policy. 

After 1 87 1 it was the chief aim of Bismarck's diplomacy to 
avert the formation of any coalition against Germany. In this 
he was wholly successful. When he was removed from office 
by William II, in 1890, Germany, Austria and Italy were in 
open defensive alliance. By a secret treaty, moreover, — the so- 
called " reinsurance treaty," which first became known in 1896, 1 
— Germany and Russia had agreed that each would observe a 
benevolent neutrality if the other were attacked by a third 
power. The chief advantage which this network of treaties 
gave Germany was the complete isolation of France. In case 
of a French attack, Germany's back was fully protected. A 
further advantage of these treaties was to place Germany, in 
any dispute between Austria and Russia, virtually in the position 
of an umpire. If Russia attacked Austria, Germany was bound 
to support Austria. If Austria attacked Russia, Germany was 
bound to observe a benevolent neutrality. And it was for Ger- 
many to determine, in case of an Austro-Russian war, which 
was the attacking party and what were Germany's treaty obliga- 

1 The existence of this treaty until 1890, and its non-renewal in that year, were first 
made known in an article in the Hamburger Nachrichten, October 24, 1896. In 
1890 and the following years it was no secret that the Hamburger Nachrichten was 
Bismarck's special organ; but his personal responsibility for particular articles was a 
matter of conjecture. His relation to this newspaper is at last definitely stated, and 
the more important articles inspired or dictated by him are reproduced, in Hofmann, 
Ftirst Bismarck, 1890-98 (191 3). The article of October 24, 1896, is reprinted in 
vol. ii, pp. 370-372. The treaty with Russia was not kept secret from the govern- 
ments of Austria-Hungary and Italy. Bismarck, November 1, 1896, in Hofmann, 
vol. ii, p. 378. Cf. Munroe Smith, "Bismarck's Latest Revelation," in Harper' s 
Weekly, December 12, 1896. 



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POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY [Vol. XXX 



tions. In the seeming tangle of agreements, Germany really 
had its hands almost wholly free. 

Formally, Germany's defensive alliance with Austria and its 
reinsurance treaty with Russia imposed upon Germany no con- 
flicting duties. Materially also, according to Bismarck, the 
treaties were consistent in their purpose. In his view, expressed 
in speeches made during his chancellorship, Germany had no 
interests in the Balkans which would justify it in risking " the 
sound bones of a single Pomeranian musketeer." 1 Russia and 
Austria, however, had interests in this region, and a conflict be- 
tween their interests might easily lead to war. The danger 
of such a conflict was minimized by the recognition of a Rus- 
sian sphere of influence in the eastern portion of the peninsula 
and of an Austrian sphere in the western. This arrangement 
was established by the two powers concerned at Reichstadt, 
where, before beginning war against Turkey, Russia secured 
the neutrality of Austria by agreeing to an eventual Austrian 
occupation of Bosnia. 2 To this arrangement Germany gave 
loyal support, notably when Russia's treatment of Prince Alex- 
ander of Bulgaria aroused popular resentment in Germany. 
" What is Bulgaria to us, or we to Bulgaria? " Bismarck asked 
his hearers in the Reichstag. And again : 

Bulgaria is assuredly not an object of sufficient magnitude that, on its 
account, Europe from Moscow to the Pyrenees and from the Baltic to 
Palermo should be hurried into a war of which no one can foresee the 
issue. In the end, after the war, we should hardly know what we had 
been fighting about. 3 

Read " Servia " for " Bulgaria " and these words might have 
been spoken in 19 14. 

Not only, in Bismarck's view, had Germany no interest either 
in supporting or in impeding a Russian movement towards 
Constantinople, 4 but he believed that 

1 Speech of December 5, 1879. 

'Bismarck, January 24, 1892, in Hofmann, vol. ii, p. 5. 
* Speech of February 6, 1888. 

4 Bismarck, December 17, 1892, in Hofmann, vol. ii, p. 187. 



No. i] 



MILITARY STRATEGY VERSUS DIPLOMACY 



47 



it would be of advantage to Germany if the Russians . . . established 
themselves in Constantinople and had to defend it. We should then 
no longer be in a position to be used by England , and occasionally also 
by Austria, as the dog to be set barking against Russian lustings for the 
Bosphorus, but we could wait to see whether Austria was attacked. 1 

Accordingly, in Bismarck's construction : 

The treaty of 1879 (regarding the German- Austrian alliance) related, 
as against Russia, solely to an eventual attack by that power upon the 
allies. On the part of Germany, the view consistently represented at 
Vienna was that the alliance covered only the Austro-Hungarian mon- 
archy, not also its Oriental policy against Russia. For this Austria was 
always advised by Germany to seek protection by separate agreements 
with equally interested states, such as England and Italy. 2 

The position which Bismarck had obtained for Germany, the 
central position on the see-saw of Austro-Russian politics, was 
assuredly capable of being utilized, as Bismarck asserted it was 
to be utilized, for the preservation of the peace of Europe. 3 
Austrian or Russian movements which threatened to disturb the 
balance of power in the Balkan peninsula could be checked by 
a very moderate degree of pressure from Berlin. All that was 
necessary was to insist that each of these powers should refrain 
from invading the sphere of influence assigned to the other. 
And so long as Russia could be restrained from attacking 
Austria, and Germany was not compelled to intervene, there 
could be no joint action of France and Russia against the Triple 
Alliance. For this reason, Bismarck tells us, the German- 
Russian reinsurance treaty (of which Austria and Italy were 
fully cognizant) was welcomed by these powers. 

1 Memoirs, p. 601; translation, vol, ii, p. 288. 

2 Bismarck, January 24, 1892, in Hofmann, vol. ii, p. 4, In an earlier article, 
April 26, 1890, Bismarck said: "The Triple Alliance covers only the damnum emer- 
gens^ not the lucrum cessans, of the powers concerned. Least of all is it Germany's 
affair to promote ambitious plans of Austria in the Balkans." Ibid., vol. i, p. 256. 
Cf. article July 15, 1892, ibid., vol. ii, p. 119. And again, July 17, 1892: "Why 
should the burden of resistance to Russia be rolled off the shoulders of the interested 
British Empire upon those of the disinterested German Empire? " Ibid., vol. ii, p. 
123. 

'Bismarck, November 1, 1896, in Hofmann, vol. ii, p. 378. 



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Our allies indeed had confidence that the Triple Alliance would be able 
to support a war on two sides, but ... it seemed to them preferable 
that a war which would demand from all the continental powers the 
most monstrous sacrifices in blood, money and property should be 
avoided altogether. 1 

The keystone of Bismarck's entire foreign policy, from the 
beginning to the end of his official career, was the maintenance 
of friendly relations with Russia. Without Russian neutrality, 
the wars which established German unity could not have been 
waged. As long as Russia was friendly, no dangerous coalition 
could be formed against the united Germany. In his memoirs, 
which were his political testament, he repeatedly insists upon < 
the necessity and the possibility of maintaining the German- 
Russian friendship. " With France," he wrote, " we shall never 
have peace; with Russia, never the necessity of war, unless 
liberal stupidities or dynastic blunders falsify the situation." 2 

With Great Britain, after 1871, Germany's relations, although 
never cordial, were usually friendly and never really strained. 
The inauguration, in 1884, of a German colonial policy naturally 
aroused British jealousy but gave no ground for hostility. In 
its colonial ventures, Bismarck told Hofmann, Germany should 
look for " sure advantages without disproportionately great 
risks, especially without conflict with older and stronger sea 
powers." 3 

Bismarck's success in establishing alliances and in averting 
the formation of any hostile coalition against Germany was due, 
in no small degree, to the spirit and temper in which he con- 
ducted Germany's diplomacy. He fully realized, not only the 
antagonism which new power arouses, but the dangers of new 
power to its possessor. They resemble, as he himself more 
than once indicated, the dangers of new wealth to the individual. 
These, as we all know, are what Richard Henry Stoddard once 
described as " the unconscious insolence of conscious opulence," 
and, associated with this, an extreme sensitiveness to criticism, 

1 Bismarck, loc. cit. 

2 Memoirs, p. 210; translation, vol. i, p. 247. 
'Hofmann, vol. i, p. 125. 



No. i] MILITARY STRATEGY VERSUS DIPLOMACY 



49 



which may easily manifest itself in increased arrogance. With 
the similar tendencies of new power we Americans are quite 
familiar, for we ourselves exhibited them in a thoroughly typi- 
cal way in the nineteenth century, particularly in the period be- 
tween the Mexican War and the Civil War. Nor, I regret to 
confess, have we yet fully outgrown these tendencies. " Shirt- 
sleeves " diplomacy is quite unmistakably parvenu diplomacy. 

To indicate these dangers of new power, Bismarck, as I have 
said, employed the very comparison which I have developed. 
In 1890, in an English speech to a body of British shipowners, 
he said that, in the society of nations, " Germany may be com- 
pared to a self-made man, whereas England is as an old aris- 
tocratic lord." 1 And when his policy toward Russia was 
assailed as conciliatory to the point of subservience, he charac- 
terized the attitude of his critics as follows : 

No far-seeing reckoning with existing factors of European policy is to 
characterize German statecraft ; its efforts are not to be directed to 
helping, as far as possible, to avoid wars of which the outcome would 
be incalculable ; but Germany should assume, in Europe, an attitude of 
provocation and play the part of the man who, suddenly enriched 
and presuming on the dollars in his pocket, tries to trample over 
everybody. 2 

It is not, I think, too much to say that Bismarck handled the 
new power of Germany as if it were old power. Temperament- 
ally, he was highly sensitive to criticism ; openly, as imperial 
chancellor, he disregarded it. Attacks in the foreign press, he 
said, were to him " printer's ink on paper." If any criticisms 
seemed to require answers, Germany's cause was defended 
neither by its officials, domestic or foreign, nor by declarations 
signed by university professors, but by unofficial communications 
or inspired leading articles in the newspapers, and usually in 
newspapers that had no overt relations with the German govern- 
ment. What was of more importance, Bismarck's conduct of for- 
eign affairs was quite in harmony with Mr. Roosevelt's formula : 

^he [London] Times, July 3, 1890. Cf. Hofmann, vol. i, p. 279. 
3 Bismarck, October 3, 1891, in Hofmann, vol. i, p. 382. 



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if he carried a big stick, he walked softly. Only against France, 
whose resentment Germany could not hope to appease, was the 
big stick occasionally shaken. This happened, usually, when 
the exigencies of democratic politics led French public men to 
indulge in the form of sport which, in American politics, has 
been known as " twisting the lion's tail." 1 In Germany's deal- 
ings with other powers there were no threats and no bluster. 
Assurances that Germany was one of the " satisfied nations " 
and desired nothing but peace were made more credible by quiet 
settlement of disputes : witness the manner in which Bismarck 
handled the conflict with Spain over the Carolines and that with 
the United States regarding the Samoan Islands. 

Ill 

Before the outbreak of the present war, arrangements were 
making in Germany to celebrate the centennial of Bismarck's 
birth, which will fall on April I, 1915. Whether such celebra- 
tions will be held, and on what scale they will be conducted, I 
am not informed. In any such celebrations, German writers 
and speakers will be confronted with a task of no little delicacy. 
It will not be easy to praise Bismarck's diplomacy without sug- 
gesting unfavorable comparisons. 

After Bismarck's dismissal from the imperial chancellorship, 
there was (with one important exception, presently to be noted) 
no change in the general trend of German foreign policy. But 
there were changes in tone and in manner. There was some 
rather " big talk " on the part of the emperor, which other 
nations took for the most part humorously. There were ap- 
pearances " in shining armor," with occasional shakings of the 
" mailed fist," which were taken more seriously. Peace was 
preserved, but on more than one occasion by employing that 
double-edged and dangerous weapon, the threat of war. Over- 
sea expansion was pushed more vigorously, and not always in 

1 Cf. statement of Thiers in Hohenlohe's diary, July 8, 1875: " I spoke then of 
the rumors of war. Thiers said those were disseminated for party motives and would 
increase. Moreover, they would be turned to account for electioneering purposes. 
We should not allow ourselves to be misled thereby." Memoirs of Prince Hohen- 
lohe, translation, vol. ii, p. 155. 



No. i] MILITARY STRATEGY VERSUS DIPLOMACY *j 

accordance with Bismarck's notion that the flag should follow, 
not precede, trade. " When I was chancellor," he told Hof- 
mann, " we never stepped in with the protection of the Empire 
until the German trader or colonist had acquired in foreign 
parts interests of sufficient magnitude and importance ; we 
never hurried on ahead of him." 1 And Hofmann tells us that 
when he showed Bismarck the first map of the East Asiatic 
coast on which the German leasehold of Kiaochau was marked 
off, the prince looked at it for some time and then said : " Big 
enough for all sorts of foolishness." 2 What he would have 
thought of the effort to get a foothold in Morocco we can only 
conjecture ; but we know that he gave diplomatic support to 
France in Tunis, on the ground that it was desirable that French 
attention should be distracted from " the hole in the Vosges." 
With the Agadir incident fresh in his mind, Hofmann wrote : 

Our Pan-Germanists hold a fundamentally false opinion of Bismarck if 
they believe that he, if still alive and in office, would have slashed in 
with the sabre in Morocco, in Persia, or anywhere else, to uphold claims 
which corresponded rather to the desires of our national- expansionists 
than to the facts of the situation or the rights of Germany. 3 

Closely associated with imperialistic expansion is the tendency 
to take part in world politics even where national interests are 
not directly involved. The diplomatic intervention of Ger- 
many, in unison with Russia and France, to compel Japan, in 
1895, to surrender the peninsula of Liaotung aroused in Bis- 
marck's mind apprehensions which were expressed in two lead- 
ing articles in the journal which he controlled. If this joint 
action meant better relations with Russia, it was of advantage, 
but why should Germany arouse Japanese hostility? To Bis- 
marck, it looked like " working for prestige " ; and his second 
article intimated that he would not have interfered. 4 

The one point in which German foreign policy changed 
immediately after Bismarck's retirement was in Germany's rela- 



1 Hofmann, vol. i, p. 126. 

3 Ibid. , vol. i, pp. 118, 119. 

4 May 7 and 23; ibid., vol. ii, pp. 298, 302. 



* Ibid., vol. i, p. 227. 



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tions to Russia. In 1890 the reinsurance treaty with that 
power lapsed, by the expiration of the term for which it was 
concluded, and, although Russia was willing to renew it, the 
German imperial government decided to abandon it. Count 
Caprivi, Bismarck was informed, found Germany's treaty rela- 
tions with Austria and Russia " too complicated." Bismarck 
admitted, with a certain malice, that " the maintenance of these 
relations of course required a considerable degree of diplomatic 
skill." 1 The probable results of this change of policy seemed 
to Bismarck very grave. He feared that Germany and Russia 
would steadily drift further apart ; and he lived to see this ap- 
prehension realized. He feared that Russia, seeking support 
against the Triple Alliance, would eventually come to an under- 
standing with France, and he lived to see the beginnings of the 
entente between these powers. He believed, and asserted as 
early as 1891 : " From the moment when the conviction is 
established in Vienna that the bridge between Germany and 
Russia is broken down, Austria will assume a different attitude 
toward the German Empire, and Germany will run the risk of 
becoming, in a sense, dependent on Austria." 2 And in the 
following year he wrote : " Already there are indications that 
the attitude of German policy is no longer completely neutral 
in Eastern affairs, as it was formerly to Germany's advantage." 3 
During the later years of his life he repeated his warnings 
against breaking with Russia and against identifying Germany's 
interests with those of Austria in the Balkans; and in his 
memoirs he wrote : 

If the breach, or even the alienation, between us and Russia should 
seem irremediable, then Vienna would believe itself entitled to make 
greater claims upon the services of its German ally ; first, in the ex- 
tension of the casus foederis , which, up till now, according to the pub- 
lished text, goes no further than defense against a Russian attack upon 
Austria; secondly, in a request to substitute for the casus foederis, as 
now defined, the representation of Austrian interests in the Balkans 



1 Bismarck, January 24, 1892, in Hofmann, vol. ii, p. 4. 

2 January 28, 1891, ibid., vol. i, p. 314. 
3 January 24, 1892, ibid. y \o\. ii, p. 5. 



No. i] MILITARY STRATEGY VERSUS DIPLOMACY 



and in the East. ... It is not, however, the duty of the German 
Empire to lend its subjects, with their goods and their lives, for the re- 
alization of its neighbor's aspirations. 1 

In Germany, these warnings fell on deaf ears. Bismarck, of 
course, was disgruntled ; nothing that his successors could do 
was right; he was simply an old grumbler. For us the ques- 
tion is not whether his utterances were dictated by vanity and 
vindictiveness or by patriotic solicitude, but whether he was 
right. 

The development of a common German-Austrian policy in the 
Balkan peninsula, which Bismarck feared, was furthered by the 
German policy of seeking to develop, not only the economic, 
but also the political influence of Germany in the Turkish 
Empire. The establishment and consolidation of German in- 
fluence in Turkey could hardly be regarded by Russia in any 
other light than as an invasion of what Germany and Austria 
had previously recognized as the Russian sphere of influence. 
Very naturally the Russian government deemed itself no longer 
bound by the arrangements which Germany disregarded, and it 
began to take measures to establish Russian influence in the 
western Balkans. Thus arose the rivalry between Austria and 
Russia for the control of Servia which has led to the present 
world war. 

Of this newer German policy Bismarck expressed his opinion 
in advance, and before his retirement from power, when, after 
stating his belief that " the European crisis most likely to arise 
is the Eastern crisis," he proceeded to condemn any attempt of 
Germany to interfere in the Balkans, saying: " A great power 
which attempts to exert pressure on the policy of other coun- 
tries, outside of its own sphere of interest, is taking risks. . . . 
It is following a policy of power, not one of interest ; it is work- 
ing for prestige." 2 

When the German-Austrian alliance was diverted from its 
original defensive purpose and became an alliance for the con- 
trol of the Balkan peninsula, Italy's adhesion to this alliance 

1 Memoirs, p. 591; translation, vol. ii, p. 276, 277. 

2 Speech of February 6, 1888. 



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ceased to correspond to Italian interests. Austria and Italy 
had no common interests in the Balkans except to resist the 
extension of Russian influence. An increased control by Austria 
of the eastern coast of the Adriatic was, from the Italian point 
of view, as undesirable as the control of this coast by any strong 
Slav state. Accordingly, the new German policy in the Balkans 
tended inevitably to the disruption of the Triple Alliance. After 
the Balkan war, Austria and Italy were able to agree in oppos- 
ing the annexation of Albania by the Balkan allies, and in crea- 
ting a nominally independent principality ; but the suspicion of 
each that the other was endeavoring to control the new state led 
to controversies which, in the early summer of 19 14, seemed to 
imperil the maintenance of friendly relations between the two 
powers. This also was a contingency which Bismarck had en- 
visaged. In the event of the collapse of the Triple Alliance, 
he wrote in 1892, " it would be for Germany a very serious sit- 
uation if, in order to avoid isolation, it had no choice but to go 
with Austria in the East through thick and thin." 1 

One of the ablest of Bismarck's successors in the chancellor- 
ship, Prince von Bu'low, stated, when he assumed that office, 
and has since maintained, that no statesman, not even a Bismarck, 
can determine the future development of a nation's policy. 
Germany, von Billow says, can not be held to old methods 
and aims. 2 In general, this statement is indisputable. Never- 
theless, as regards aims which were taking form in Bismarck's 
time or which he clearly foresaw, his favorable or unfavorable 
judgment is of weight. As regards new methods, it is admis- 
sible to inquire whether they have proved as advantageous, in 
their direct and indirect results, as those which he employed. 

IV 

The position of Germany today is strikingly different from 
that in which Bismarck left it in 1890. Today Germany and 
Austria are confronted by a formidable coalition. Italy is 
neutral. Rumania, supposed to have been in sympathy with 
the Triple Alliance, is also neutral. The armed support of 

1 Bismarck, January 24, 1892, in Hofmann, vol. ii, p. 6. 

2 Imperial Germany, translation, p. 16. 



No. i] MILITARY STRATEGY VERSUS DIPLOMACY 

Turkey has indeed been secured, not by diplomacy of the ordi- 
nary kind, but by a coup d'etat engineered by German officers 
in the Turkish military service. The participation of Turkey in 
the war, however, increases the probability of further interven- 
tions, through which military forces greater than those of the 
sultan may be thrown upon the side of the hostile coalition. In 
population and in economic resources the enemies of Germany, 
Austria and Turkey are greatly superior; on the sea, their fight- 
ing power is many times greater; on land, in spite of inferior 
preparation, their power seems to be substantially equal, even 
if Japan's army be left out of the reckoning. The German em- 
peror is reported to have said: " The more enemies, the more 
honor," but the saying is true of the soldier only. For the 
diplomatist, the more enemies, the less honor. 

In striking contrast, again, with the position which Prussia 
held in every war which it waged in Bismarck's time, is the fact 
that on the face of the record Austria and Germany are the 
aggressors. The correspondence published by five of the bel- 
ligerents has been examined and analyzed so often and so 
minutely that I shall only recapitulate the points which have 
most strongly influenced neutral opinion. 

Until Austrian diplomacy emerged into publicity with the 
ultimatum to Servia on July 23, the Dual Monarchy appeared 
to have strong claims on neutral sympathy. Continued hostile 
agitation in Servia ; alleged intrigues in Austria's Slav provinces ; 
pledges of more neighborly behavior repeatedly broken ; finally, 
the murder of the successor to the throne, through a conspiracy 
asserted to have been framed in the Servian capital and to have 
been abetted by Servian officials — these were indeed grievances. 
Neutral sympathy was sensibly lessened by the far-reaching de- 
mands formulated in the Austrian ultimatum, and even more 
by the unusual and peremptory tone of this undiplomatic com- 
munication. From the diplomatic point of view, the Russian 
minister of foreign affairs was quite justified in saying that its 
form was "scarcely clever" (pete habile). x Neutral sympathy 

Russian Orange Paper, no. 25. Even the German secretary of state confessed 
that " the note left much to be desired as a diplomatic document." British Blue 
Book, no. 18. 



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began to shift to the other side in consequence of Servia's un- 
expectedly conciliatory reply and Austria's refusal to recognize 
Servia's concessions as a possible basis for negotiation or medi- 
ation. Instead of turning away wrath, Servia's soft answer 
elicited a declaration of war. Whatever neutral inclination to- 
ward the Austrian cause remained was stricken through with 
doubt by the revelations of IVL Giolitti, former prime minister 
of Italy. He has told us that in August, 191 3, Italy was noti- 
fied that Austria contemplated action against Servia; that it 
deemed such action defensive; and that it hoped to receive 
German and Italian support. The Italian answer was that such 
action could not be regarded as defensive. " Our interpreta- 
tion of the treaty," Giolitti added, " was accepted by our allies." 1 
This revelation has not unnaturally produced the impression 
that Austria's action in 19 14 was determined less by Servian 
intrigues and Servian faithlessness than by a matured resolution 
to seize the first favorable opportunity to strengthen the posi- 
tion of the Dual Monarchy in the Balkan peninsula. 

Germany had given its ally " an entirely free hand " in its 
action against Servia. 2 Germany's efforts to maintain the peace 
of Europe, whether through its ordinary diplomatic service or 
through the direct appeals of the German emperor to other 
sovereigns, were limited to trying to " localize" the conflict, 
that is, to trying to keep Austria's hands free against Servia. 

This, at least, was the attitude of Austria and Germany July 
23-28. On the 29th, at Germany's request, 3 the Austrian am- 
bassador at St. Petersburg was directed to begin conversations 
with the Russian minister of foreign affairs. Within the two 
following days, Austria had agreed to consider the withdrawal 
of such of its demands as were deemed incompatible with 
Servia's independence, and to admit mediation on this point; 
and Russia had agreed to suspend its military preparations if 
Austria would stay its action against Servia. 4 At this juncture, 

Speech in the Italian Parliament, December 5, 1914. See American newspapers 
of December 7. 

2 German White Paper, Memorandum. 3 Ibid. 

4 Russian Orange Paper, nos. 53, 60, 67; French Yellow Book, nos. 104, 114, 
120, 121; British Blue Book, nos. 97, 103, 161 (especially p. 83). 



No. i] 



MILITARY STRATEGY VERSUS DIPLOMACY 



57 



however, on July 31, Germany demanded that Russia should 
demobilize, and, upon Russia's refusal, declared war, August 1. 
On July 31, Germany inquired what attitude France would as- 
sume in a war between Germany and Russia, and, receiving no 
satisfactory assurances on this point, declared war against France, 
August 3. On August 2 Germany invaded Luxemburg, and on 
the evening of the same day, it demanded free passage through 
Belgium, under express threat of war and scarcely veiled threat 
of annexation. 1 On Belgium's refusal, German troops crossed 
the Belgian frontier, August 4. 

If any one of the series of events which precipitated the 
European war can be regarded as decisive, it was the action of 
Germany in declaring war because Russia was mobilizing. In 
international theory and practice, however, mobilization is not 
generally regarded as cause for war. The proper answer to 
mobilization is mobilization. 2 

On the other hand, on the face of the record, Servia, Russia, 
France and Belgium were, each and all of them, countries 
attacked; and none of them, with the possible exception of 
Servia, had committed any overt act which gave Austria or Ger- 
many formal cause for war. 

With Great Britain, it is true, Germany sought to maintain 
peace, and it was Great Britain that attacked Germany. Ger- 
many, however, gave Great Britain an unimpeachable ground 
for declaring war by violating treaty obligations which secured 
long-recognized and important British interests. 3 Great Britain 

1 '* If Belgium consents, in the war about to commence, to take up an attitude of 
friendly neutrality toward Germany, the German government on its part undertakes, 
on the declaration of peace, to guarantee the kingdom and its possessions in their 
whole extent. ... If Belgium behaves in a hostile manner . . . Germany will take 
no engagements towards Belgium but will leave the later settlement of the relations 
of the two states toward one another to the decision of arms." Belgian Gray Paper, 
no. 20. 

2 For Bismarck's theory and practice, cf. infra, pp. 65, 66. 

3 None of the arguments advanced by Germany's apologists to show that the 
treaties of 1839, neutralizing Belgium, were no longer binding on Prussia (either be- 
cause Prussia has become a part of the German Empire, or because provisional 
agreements, reinforcing these treaties, were made in 1870) has any basis in international 
theory or practice. Moreover, the intention of Germany to respect these treaties was 
asserted by the present imperial chancellor in 191 1 and by the present imperial secre- 
tary of state in 191 3. Cf. Belgian Gray Paper, no. 12, and enclosures. 



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attacked Germany by the same right by which Prussia and 
Austria attacked Denmark in 1864. That Great Britain had 
other grounds for declaring war is not disputed. They are 
indicated in the correspondence published by the British govern- 
ment, 1 and they were frankly stated — and put first — by Sir 
Edward Grey in his speech in the House of Commons, August 
3. 2 If among its various grounds for declaring war, the British 
government finally selected that which was formally the best 
and which would appeal most strongly to public sentiment in 
Great Britain and in other countries, it is not chargeable with 
insincerity or with hypocrisy. Any other course would have 
been unintelligent. As far as the appeal to public sentiment is 
concerned, Austria and Germany acted in the same way ; the 
former in the stress it laid upon the crime of Serajevo, the latter 
in charging the Russian emperor with " perfidy " because his 
armies were mobilizing while the German emperor was con- 
ducting direct personal negotiations with him. 3 

On the face of the record again, the powers of the Triple 
Entente, and preeminently Great Britain, exhibited an apparently 
sincere desire to maintain the peace of Europe. In the brief 
time available, between Austria's ultimatum to Servia, July 23, 
and Germany's ultimatum to Russia, July 31, these powers, and 
also Italy, seem to have made every possible effort to avert war. 

The Austrian and German governments assert, indeed, that 
these efforts were insincere. They claim that in reality Russia 
was the prime aggressor. They asserted from the outset 
that Russia had no right to intervene, even through its diplo- 
macy, to protect Servia. If the division of spheres of influence 
in the Balkan peninsula, as it existed at the close of the nine- 
teenth century, had persisted, this assertion would be plausible. 
In fact, however, as we have seen, this arrangement had long 
been abandoned, 4 and primarily because of German encroach- 
ments upon the Russian sphere of influence. 4 By attacking 

1 Cf. British Blue Book, especially nos. 89, 101, III. 2 Ibid., pp. 89-96. 

3 This was the casus belli emphasized in all the German newspapers in the early 
days of August. 

4 For Austrian recognition of its abandonment, at least since the Balkan War, cf. 
British Blue Book, nos. 91, 118. 



No. i] MILITARY STRATEGY VERSUS DIPLOMACY 59 

Servia, Austria menaced the existing balance of power in the 
Balkans; and it was on this ground, not on the ground of a duty 
to protect a Slav state, that Russia intervened. 1 Austria indeed 
declared that it had no intention of disturbing the balance of 
power, 2 and it offered to promise not to annex Servian territory ; 
but it was unable to satisfy Russia that Servian independence 
was not threatened. 3 It was precisely on this last point that 
negotiations were in progress when Germany declared war. 

The German government asserts that Belgium had ceased to 
be neutral and was virtually in alliance with France and Great 
Britain. 4 If this assertion could be proved, the strongest pre- 
judice which Germany's conduct of the war has aroused in 
neutral countries would tend to disappear. In America, at 
least, few people care whether the treaties of 1839 were or 
were not in force and binding upon Prussia. Even if Belgium 
was no longer a neutralized country, it was apparently a neutral 
country, and it has been ravaged with fire and steel because so 
the German armies could reach France most quickly. What, 
however, has Germany been able to prove? Only that British 
military attaches had concerted with Belgian military authorities 
plans of joint action against a German invasion. If, as is in- 
sisted, no consultations were held with German military at- 
taches to provide for the defence of Belgian neutrality against 
a French or British invasion, what does that prove? Only that 
the Belgians knew well or guessed rightly on which side their 
neutrality was menaced. 

The German assertion, made in the ultimatum to Belgium, 
that France was planning to send troops through Belgium into 
Germany, and the more recent assertion that Great Britain in- 
tended to send troops into Belgium without waiting until Ger- 
man troops crossed the Belgian frontier, can have no influence 
upon neutral opinion. Neither in law nor in morals, public or 

Russian Orange Paper, no. 77. 

'German White Paper, Memorandum and annex 10. 

3 Russian Orange Paper, nos. 41, 60, 67. 

* The Case of Belgium, in the light of official reports found in the archives of the 
Belgian government. With an introduction by Dr. Bernhard Dernburg (n. d.). 



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private, is a wrong excused by alleging, or even by proving, 
that a similar wrong was contemplated by an adversary. More- 
over, neither of these assertions has been proved. Of such an 
intention on the part of the French government no evidence 
has been submitted ; and the only evidence adduced to prove 
such an intention on the part of the British government is the 
opinion expressed by a British military attache. 1 It is, how- 
ever, a matter of common knowledge that military attaches are 
never empowered to commit their governments to any line of 
action, and that their opinions, if not purely personal, reflect at 
most the desires of their military chiefs, not the intentions of 
the political heads of government. 

In asserting that they were really attacked or threatened with 
attack, Austria and Germany are today in the position in which 
Bismarck's adversaries habitually found themselves ; they can not 
prove their assertions. If in the future, on the basis of evidence 
which we do not possess, the historian shall be able to show that in 
1 914 the Triple Entente brought about a European war in order 
to crush Germany and dismember Austria, he will still be forced 
to say that the conspiring governments played the diplomatic 
game according to Bismarckian traditions ; and if he fails to at- 
tribute to Grey or to Sazonoff as high a degree of adroitness as 
Bismarck displayed, it will be because the ineptitude of their 
adversaries made their task easier than his. 

V 

The inferiority of Austrian and German diplomacy in 1914 
to that of Bismarck in the German unity wars might plausibly 
be explained by the personal difference between a statesman of 
genius and the average diplomatist. This, however, hardly ac- 
counts for the inferiority of Austro-German diplomacy to that 
of the Triple Entente. It is the chief purpose of this paper to 
suggest an explanation. 

In the histories, biographies artd memoirs of the Bismarckian 
period we read of conflicts between the Prussian premier and 
German chancellor on the one hand, and the military leaders, 

'The Case of Belgium, p. 12. 



No. i] 



MILITARY STRATEGY VERSUS DIPLOMACY 



61 



notably the chief of the General Staff, on the other. These are 
usually regarded as collisions of strong personalities, ascribable 
largely to competing personal ambitions. They mean more 
than this. They represent the natural and apparently necessary 
antithesis of the political and the military mind ; and they typify 
the perpetual and universal struggle between diplomacy and 
military strategy. 

We have seen what Bismarck thought of policies of power 
and of prestige. To the soldier, however, the state is power ; 
and the fear which its power inspires in other states, which is 
one form of prestige, is essential to its welfare, if not to its ex- 
istence. Prestige, however, which is at best only the image or 
reflection of the substantial, and may be mere semblance 6r 
illusion, is protean in its aspects. It is often the reflection of 
success. It is often the illusion of dignity or of honor. To 
General Bernhardi (who in this respect, as in others, typifies the 
military mind) honor and dignity, as well as success in war and 
the fear which such success inspires, are all indistinguishably 
blended in the notion of prestige. He writes : 

War seems imperative when, although the material basis of power is 
not threatened , the moral influence of the state . . . seems to be pre- 
judiced. . . . Apparently trifling causes may under certain circum- 
stances constitute a fully justifiable casus belli, if the honor of the state, 
and consequently its moral prestige, are endangered. An antagonist 
must never be allowed to believe that there is any lack of determination 
to assert this prestige, even if the sword must be drawn to do so. 1 

Very weighty and very thorny questions are begged in the vague 
phrase, " under certain circumstances." The sentiments which 
long maintained the duel in England and in America, and still 
maintain it in continental Europe, are far stronger in the mili- 
tary class than among civilians. Today, as in the sixteenth cen- 
tury, the soldier is " jealous in honor, sudden and quick in 
quarrel." To slight discourtesies, even to lack of deference, the 
European officer, and particularly the German officer, exhibits 
an extreme sensitiveness. This reappears, pushed to the point 



1 Bernhardi, Germany and the Next War, translation, pp. 49, 50. 



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[Vol. XXX 



of caricature, in the German corps student. Closely related to 
this sensitiveness is the disastrous notion that " trifling causes " 
may so endanger the prestige of the state as to justify war. 
Bismarck was a Junker ; he had swung the SchlageraX. Gottingen ; 
he was a Prussian military officer ; but Bismarck the statesman 
wrote: " International conflicts, which can be settled only by 
wars between peoples, I have never regarded from the point of 
view of the student duel and its code of honor." 1 

Another difference between the military and the political 
mind, less fundamental, perhaps, but not less important, reveals 
itself when there is question of anticipating a war because it is 
deemed inevitable and the moment seems favorable. On this 
point Bismarck and Moltke were, on at least two occasions, of 
different opinions. In 1867, during the dispute over Luxem- 
burg, Moltke said to a fellow member of the North German 
Parliament, Count Bethusy-Huc : 

I cannot but wish that the occasion given for a war with France were 
taken advantage of. Unhappily I regard this war as absolutely unavoid- 
able within the next five years, and within this period the now indis- 
putable superiority of our organization and weapons will be equaled by 
France. . . . The sooner, therefore, we come to blows the better. 

Bethusy laid Moltke's views before Bismarck. The latter " rec- 
ognized the justice of Moltke's remarks," but declared that he 
could not assume responsibility for the course of action pro- 
posed. " The personal conviction of a ruler or statesman, how- 
ever well founded, that war would eventually break out, could 
not justify its promotion. Unforeseen events might alter the 
situation and avert what seemed inevitable." 2 

In 1875, again, when Germany was disquieted by the rapid 
reestablishment of French power and by the apparently general 

1 Memoirs, p. 605; translation, vol. ii, p. 294. 

2 Essays, Speeches and Memoirs of Count Helmuth von Moltke, translation (1893), 
vol. ii, pp. 204, 205. Bismarck alludes to this episode in his Memoirs, pp. 441, 442, 
translation, vol. ii, p. 103. There is other contemporary evidence that in 1867 he 
was not convinced that war with France was either inevitable or desirable. In 1870 
his view had changed. He had decided that war with France was necessary for the 
completion of German unity and was therefore to be promoted. Cf. article, January 
16, 1893, in Hofmann, vol. ii, pp. 196, 197. 



No. I] MILITARY STRATEGY VERSUS DIPLOMACY 



63 



desire of the French people for revenge, and when the German 
military party wished to crush France before it became stronger, 
Bismarck opposed the plan. Of this episode he wrote : 

Such a war, in my opinion, would not have led to permanently tenable 
conditions in Europe, but might well have given rise to a common 
feeling of distrust on the part of Russia, Austria and England and 
eventually to concerted action on their part against the new and not 
yet consolidated Empire, which, in waging such a war, would have 
started on the road on which the first and second French Empires, 
in a continuous policy of war and prestige, went to meet destruction. 
Europe would have seen in our action an abuse of the power we had 
acquired, and everyone's hand . . . would have been persistently 
raised against Germany or would have been on the sword hilt. 1 

According to Bismarck, the military plan of seizing the first 
favorable opportunity of crushing France was not abandoned 
in 1875. " Later also," he says, this plan was advocated; 
but he remained convinced that it was impossible to say that 
any war was inevitable. No one, he said, " can look into the 
cards held by Providence." 2 And, as was his wont, he summed 
up his views in a single pregnant phrase, declaring that offensive 
war to anticipate a possible attack was, " in a sense, suicide in 
apprehension of death." 

1 Memoirs, p. 519; translation, vol. ii, p. 192. Cf. pp. 516-522; translation, 

vol. ii, pp. 188-195. £f* a ^ so article, November 4, 1892, in Hofmann, vol. ii, 
pp. 160, 161. 

It was assumed at the time in France and in England, and it is still commonly 
asserted, that Bismarck himself supported the plan of attacking France in 1875, and 
was deterred only by Russian and English protests. Of this I find no proof; and 
such an attitude on Bismarck's part seems to me improbable, because it would have 
been inconsistent with his entire policy from 1871 to the close of his administration. # 
By those who assert Bismarck's desire to force a war in 1875, no value is attached to 
his own denials; wrongly, I think; for while Bismarck sometimes was guilty of sup- 
pressing the truth and of suggesting falsehood, he had a possibly inconsistent but 
very marked unwillingness to employ the lie direct. Testimony that Bismarck was 
not in sympathy with the plan of the military party is afforded in the diary of 
Prince Hohenlohe, who at the time was the German ambassador in Paris. Cf. 
Memoirs of Prince Hohenlohe, translation, vol. ii, pp. 129, 131, 145-146, 155, 
160. The truth seems to be that Bismarck permitted the threat of war to be carried 
to a certain point for the sake of checking open expression of French hostility. 

2 Memoirs, p. 442; translation, vol. ii, p. 103. 



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Bernhardi reasserts the military point of view : 

When there are indications of an offensive alliance of stronger enemies 
who only await the favorable moment to strike, the moral duty of the 
state towards its citizens is to begin the struggle while the prospects of 
success and the political circumstances are still tolerably favorable. 1 

Bismarck did not live to see the formation of the Triple En- 
tente, to which Bernhardi obviously alludes ; but, long before 
Russia and France had joined hands, he had spoken of the 
possibility of a future war with these powers and of the attitude 
which Germany should assume. In 1888, addressing the Ger- 
man Parliament, he said : 

If I were to come before you and say : We are seriously menaced 
by France and by Russia ; it is to be foreseen that we shall be attacked ; 
that is my conviction as a diplomatist, based also on military informa- 
tion ; for our defense it is better to employ the anticipatory thrust of 
the attack and open hostilities at once ; accordingly, I ask the Imperial 
Diet for a credit of a milliard of marks in order to start the war against 
both our neighbors — well, gentlemen, I do not know whether you have 
sufficient confidence in me to vote such a grant. I hope not. . . . 
We must not let the advantage of the defensive position escape us , even 
if at the moment we are . . . superior to our future enemies. . . . 
Even if we are attacked at an unfavorable moment, we shall be strong 
enough for our defense. And we shall keep the chance of peace, leav- 
ing it to Divine Providence to determine whether in the meantime the 
necessity of war may not disappear. 2 

It is not when war seems probable in the near future, but 
when it is in sight, that military considerations come into sharp- 
est conflict with the aims of the diplomatist. On more than 
one occasion, during the German unity wars, the military de- 
mand for prompt action threatened to deprive Bismarck of the 
time he needed for the attainment of his diplomatic ends. In 
1864, when it seemed to him of the utmost importance that 
Prussia should take no steps without Austria, it was a military 
point of honor that menaced his policy. He tells the story in 
his memoirs : 

1 Germany and the Next War, translation, p. 53. 
a Speech of February 6, 1888. 



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65 



Our further cooperation with Austria was imperiled, in the first place, 
by energetic pressure of military influences on the king, to persuade 
him to cross the Jutland frontier without Austria. My old friend Field 
Marshal Wrangel telegraphed to the king, and not in cipher, the gross- 
est insults against me. In one of these telegrams there was a passage, 
obviously referring to me, about diplomatists who belonged on the 
gallows. 1 

More important and more typical was a difference of opinion 
between Bismarck and Moltke in 1866. In the four months 
preceding the war against Austria, Bismarck conducted what, 
for our present purposes, is perhaps the most instructive of all 
his ante helium campaigns. Precisely because he was forcing 
war upon Austria, he was particularly anxious to avoid the ap- 
pearance of aggression. Accordingly, at every stage in the 
dispute, he kept Prussia one move behind Austria in the matter 
of open military preparations. In the middle of March, Austria 
concentrated troops in Bohemia. In reply, Prussia placed its 
active army in a state of readiness for war. In the course of 
April, several of the smaller German states began to make 
military preparations. On April 8, a treaty of alliance was 
concluded between Prussia and Italy, and Italy began to mobi- 
lize. Austria then mobilized in the south against Italy; and, 
in the last days of April, it ordered a general mobilization. 
During this month, Austria twice offered to stay its military 
preparations if Prussia would do the same; but it demanded 
free hand against Italy, and Prussia refused to leave its ally in 
the lurch. During the first half of May, Prussia mobilized its 
reserves and concentrated troops on the Saxon frontier and in 
Silesia. Then it waited. At this point, Moltke lost patience. 
He wished an immediate commencement of military operations, 
because, with every day's delay, the imperfectly equipped and 
only partially concentrated hostile forces were growing stronger. 2 
King William, however, supported Bismarck, and the Prussian 
troops were held in leash for nearly a month after mobilization. 

1 Memoirs, p. 323; translation, vol. i, p. 379. 

2 Sybel, Begriindung des deutschen Reichs, vol. iv, p. 421; translation, vol. iv, 
p. 471. 



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Then at last Bismarck got what he was waiting for — overt ag- 
gression on the part of Austria. 1 

These were not the only differences between Bismarck and 
the General Staff. Other conflicts are recorded, concerning the 
conduct of military operations and concerning terms of peace. 
When war has broken out, the leaders of the army resent, and 
not without reason, the intrusion of political considerations in 
the discussion of what are primarily military questions. Bis- 
marck, however, insisted that " the determination and limitation 
of the objects which are to be attained by war . . . are and re- 
main, during the war as before its outbreak, political problems ; 
and the way in which these are solved cannot be without influ- 
ence upon the conduct of the war." 2 As regards terms of 
peace, Bismarck came once at least into sharp conflict with the 
leaders of the Prussian army. In 1866, after the defeat of 
Austria, they wished to enter Vienna and to demand cession 
of Austrian territory as well as a large war indemnity. Believ- 
ing that the common interests of Austria and Germany would 
eventually draw them together again, and desiring to avoid such 
resentment as needlessly humiliating terms of peace would leave 
rankling in Austrian minds, Bismarck successfully opposed these 
demands. In 1870-71, also, there seems to have been a differ- 
ence of opinion between Bismarck and the military men regard- 
ing the annexation of French territory. Here again, Bismarck 
appreciated the dangers of lasting rancor on the part of the de- 
feated nation ; but how far and how strongly he opposed the 
military demands is uncertain. In any case, the reasons that 
he gave for the annexation of Alsace and Lorraine to Germany 
were purely strategic. This is, I think, the only instance in 
which he allowed his political instincts to be controlled by 
military considerations. 

1 As regards the manner in which a country should meet a menacing concentration 
of troops on its frontier, Bismarck expressed himself twenty years later in the same 
serse in which he acted in 1866. Concentration of troops, he said, was a matter 
corcerning which explanations even were not to be demanded. " If one begins to 
ask fcr explanations, the reply may be somewhat ambiguous, and then the triplica- 
tion will be quite free from ambiguity." Concentration of troops should be met by 
taking quietly the necessary military precautions. Speech of February 6, 1888. 

2 Memoirs, p. 445; translation, vol. ii, p. 106. 



No. i] MILITARY STRATEGY VERSUS DIPLOMACY fry 

In all these conflicts, the military opponents of Bismarck 
showed failure to appreciate the imponderables. This, I think, 
is typical of the military mind. The business of the diplomatist 
is to persuade ; that of the soldier is to crush. The diplomatist 
has to get under the skin of his adversary, not with lead or steel, 
but with imagination. And when it comes to divining the 
sentiments and prejudices of men of alien blood and speech, it 
is necessary to be well versed in their national history. For 
these and other studies essential to the diplomatist, the military 
officer has no sufficient leisure. With the increasing complexity 
of the instruments and methods of warfare, his professional 
training becomes more and more exacting of toil and of time. 

When the question is of anticipating or averting a probable 
war, or of hastening or delaying an imminent war, the strate- 
gist, because he does not give due consideration to the im- 
ponderables, is unable justly to appreciate the political advan- 
tages of the defensive attitude. He is apt, rather, to ignore 
them entirely, because of his appreciation of the advantages of 
aggression. Earlier mobilization may mean initial victories ; 
these encourage his soldiers and discourage the enemy's. In- 
itial success, again, may well have more influence on the atti- 
tude of doubtful allies or wavering neutrals than any prejudice 
created by aggression. Desire to keep his country's attitude 
correct on the face of the record seems to him an idle scruple ; 
to permit the enemy either to grow stronger or to strike first 
seems a crime. When Moltke heard of Bismarck's decision not 
to fight France in 1867, he said : " Bismarck's standpoint is un- 
assailable ; but it will one day cost us many human lives." 1 
And the younger Moltke (German chief of staff at the out- 
break of the present war) is reported to have said in 191 3: 
" The commonplaces as to the responsibility of the aggressor 
must be disregarded. . . . We must forestall our principal ad- 

1 Memoirs of Moltke, loc. cit. In this instance Moltke's forecast seems not to 
have been verified. During the three years 1867-1870 the reorganization of the 
forces of the smaller German states on the Prussian model gave Germany a greater 
accession of strength than France secured by its military reforms and improved arma- 
ment. That in 1867 any success comparable to that of 1870 could have been gained 
by Germany with smaller sacrifices is highly improbable. Cf. Bismarck, September 
16, 1892, in Hofmann, vol. ii, p. 150. 



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[Vol. XXX 



versary as soon as there are nine chances in ten that we are 
going to have war." 1 

Bismarck's reflections on the relation of military aspirations 
to state policy are presented in many parts of his memoirs. I 
quote one passage : 

It is natural that, in the General Staff of the army, not only younger 
officers of ambition but also strategists of experience should feel the 
desire to turn to account and to make clear on the pages of history 
the efficiency of the troops they lead and their own capacity for leader- 
ship. It would be regrettable if the warlike spirit did not thus permeate 
the army. The duty of keeping the effects of this spirit within the 
limits which the need of the people for peace may justly demand, rests 
upon the political and not upon the military heads of the state. That 
the General Staff and its chiefs . . . have occasionally permitted 
themselves to be misled into imperiling peace lies in the necessary 
spirit of the institution — a spirit which I should not desire to see disap- 
pear. It becomes dangerous only under a monarch whose policy lacks 
sense of proportion and capacity of resisting one-sided and constitution- 
ally unjustifiable influences. 2 

Throughout the reign of William I, as Bismarck here implies, 
diplomacy had a fair hearing whenever military considerations 
threatened to thwart the attainment of its ends. That the case 
for diplomacy was always effectively presented goes without 
saying ; but it should be remembered that even a statesman of 
Bismarck's personal force and power of persuasion would have 
been seriously handicapped in such conflicts if he had not been 
able to speak with the authority of an independent and respon- 
sible minister. He had this authority because William I did 
not conceive that a monarch should personally direct either 
domestic government or diplomacy. 

William II seems to have taken from the outset a different 
view of monarchic duty. Even before Bismarck's retirement 
from office, the old prince had prophesied that the young em- 
peror would some day be his own chancellor. In fact, William 

1 Report of Jules Cambon, French ambassador in Berlin, May 6, 1913. French 
Yellow Book, no. 3. 

2 Memoirs, p. 442; translation, vol. ii, p. 103. 



No. i] MILITARY STRATEGY VERSUS DIPLOMACY $g 

II appears to have taken into his own hands, among other mat- 
ters, the supreme direction of Germany's foreign relations. It is 
therefore hardly an exaggeration to say that, in conflicts between 
military strategy and diplomacy, not only the decision but also 
the effective representation of the diplomatic view has devolved 
upon the emperor. His chancellors have been vice-chancellors ; 
his secretaries of state for foreign affairs have been under- 
secretaries. When the chancellorship was held by men of 
such intelligence and force as Hohenlohe and Bulow, they were 
doubtless able to exercise no little influence. During the 
chancellorship of Caprivi and that of Bethmann-Hollweg, the 
imperial initiative seems to have been subjected to less restraint. 
Direct monarchic government, however, inevitably tends to draw 
into ministerial office men of the Caprivi type rather than men of 
the Hohenlohe type. Not only are they easier to get, but it is 
easier to keep them. When, in connection with the first of the 
" chancellor crises " after Bismarck's retirement, the German 
press commented on the scarcity of suitable candidates, Bis- 
marck said : " To find persons who, by virtue of their talents as 
well as their character, seem indicated for the position of im- 
perial chancellor, but who represent no convictions of their own, 
is of course no easy matter." 1 

VI 

That in 1914 the Austrian and German governments suc- 
cumbed to the peril which Bismarck always successfully resisted, 
that they sacrificed the moral and political advantages of the 
defensive position to the strategic advantages of the prompt 
attack, is clear on the face of the record. The rapidity with 
which they acted is in itself conclusive. If they desired to 
avert a European war, the space of eight days (July 23-31) 
was obviously insufficient to obtain an adjustment of the dif- 
ferences between Austria and Russia; and it proved insufficient 
even to reach an agreement on any method by which these dif- 
ferences might be adjusted. If, on the other hand, Austria and 
Germany desired to promote a European war, they could not 

1 March 14, 1893, in Hofmann, vol. ii, p. 217. 



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hope within so short a time to force Russia against its will to 
any overt act of hostility. 

According to the military plan of the central empires, Austria 
was to crush Servia before Russia could effectively intervene. 
If Russia could be restrained from intervention, 1 well and good. 
Austria's position in the Balkan peninsula would be strengthened, 
and its prestige 2 would be enhanced. If, however, Russia should 
intervene, France of course would support Russia ; and in that 
case Germany was to cripple France before the slow-moving 
Russian masses could seriously threaten Austria-Hungary or 

1 That Austria and Germany expected to succeed in localizing the Austro- Servian 
war seems improbable. The fact that their diplomatists steadily asserted such an expec- 
tation is quite explicable; they were steadily maintaining that Russia had no reason 
to interfere, and they could not well say that they expected Russia to act unreason- 
ably. If, indeed, Great Britain had aided the central empires in their effort to re- 
strain Russia, as the German Foreign Office urged it to do (British Blue Book, nos. 
II, 46), and as the German chancellor (speech in the German Parliament, Decem- 
ber 2, 1914) still asserts that it should have done, it is at least possible (although 
not, as he affirms, certain) that Austria would have been permitted to chastise Servia 
without Russian interference. That Germany expected Great Britain to follow any 
such course — to cut loose from the Triple Entente and to support the policy of the 
central empires — is, however, hardly credible. And it must not be forgotten that 
Russia warned Austria and Germany, on July 24 and later, that it could not remain 
indifferent to the fate of Servia (German White Paper, annex 4; Russian Orange 
Paper, no. 10). On the other hand, British and Italian diplomatists were of the 
opinion that Germany and Austria did not think Russia in earnest (British Blue Book, 
nos. 71, 80; French Yellow Book, nos. 50, 96), at least not until July 29 (British 
Bhie Book, no. 94). And, according to the Russian minister of foreign affairs, the 
German ambassador at St. Petersburg assured his government that Russia would not 
go to war (British Blue Book, no. 139), and " completely broke down " on learning 
that war was inevitable {ibid., no. 97). 

3 It is an interesting and possibly significant fact that the one European power 
whose " prestige " seems to have been in question was Austria. In the entire diplo- 
matic correspondence published by the different governments we find the word used 
only in reference to this power. It was employed to explain the Austrian attitude, 
not only by Italian, French and Russian diplomatists (British Blue Book, nos. 38, 76, 
and Russian Orange Paper, no. 14), but by the Austrian minister of foreign affairs 
himself, who told the British ambassador at Vienna, July 28, that the " prestige of 
the Dual Monarchy was engaged, and nothing could now prevent conflict " with Ser- 
via (British Blue Book, no. 61). Without using the word "prestige," the German 
Foreign Office indicated the existence at Vienna of a degree of touchiness closely 
related to the soldier's and duelist's sense of honor: Germany hesitated to urge 
Austria to moderation, because " any idea that they were being pressed would be 
likely to cause them to precipitate matters." British Blue Book, nos. 76, 107, and 
Russian Orange Paper, no. 51. 



No. i] MILITARY STRATEGY VERSUS DIPLOMACY 



71 



Germany. This plan, which was not first formed in 19 14/ was 
revealed in all its essential details at the outbreak of the war. 
In the published diplomatic correspondence we can see how it 
controlled all the negotiations and thwarted every effort of Ger- 
man diplomacy to maintain even the semblance of a pacific 
attitude. 2 

Of the relations between diplomatic and military plans and 
efforts at Vienna we know practically nothing. 3 Of the situa- 
tion in Berlin, however, we know a good deal. There is evi- 
dence that the German Foreign Office, if left to its own devices, 
would have tried to play the diplomatic game on Bismarckian 
lines, keeping one move behind the adversary in military prep- 
aration. On July 27, the German secretary of state for foreign 
affairs, von Jagow, told the French ambassador, Jules Cambon, 
that " if Russia mobilized, Germany would be obliged to mobi- 
lize as well." In reply to Cambon's question, " if Germany 
would believe herself bound to mobilize in the event of Russia 
mobilizing only on her Austrian frontier," von Jagow replied in 
the negative. He added that " if Russia attacked Austria, Ger- 
many would have to attack at once on her side. The proposed 
British intervention in St. Petersburg and Vienna could there- 
fore . . . become effective only if events were not precipitated." 4 
Events, however, were precipitated. On July 30, on the basis 
of information received from one of the other ambassadors in 
Berlin, Cambon reported to Paris : 

2 Cf. dispatch of the French ambassador in Berlin, May 6, 191 3; French Yellow 
Book, no. 3. 

'That other governments besides those of Germany and of Austria were influenced 
by strategic considerations is indubitable. This is particularly clear in the case of 
Russia; cf. Russian Orange Paper, no. 48; French Yellow Book, nos. 103, 118; 
British Blue Book, nos. 44, 70, 97, 113. Neither Russia nor its allies, however, 
allowed military considerations so to control their policy as to lose the moral and polit- 
ical advantages of the defensive position. 

* We hear something, however, of divergent desires. A French consular report 
asserted, July 20, that the Austrian minister of foreign affairs and the diplomatiss 
wished " at most a localized operation against Servia," while a militarygroup ac-t 
cepted "the idea of a conflict on a general scale — in other words, a conflagration." 
French Yellow Book, no. 14. 

♦French Yellow Book, no. 67. Von Jagow made the same statements to the 
British ambassador in Berlin; cf. British Blue Book, no. 43. 



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According to the under secretary of state, the military authorities are 
urging strongly that mobilization should be decreed, on the ground that 
any delay will lose Germany some of her advantages. Up to the present, 
however, it has been possible to resist successfully the haste of the 
General Staff, which in mobilization sees war. 1 

Later in the same day, Cambon had a conversation with von 
Jagow, in which the latter expressed his fear that 

Austria might mobilize completely in consequence of the partial Russian 
mobilization, which might bring about the answering blow of total Rus- 
sian mobilization and, in consequence, that of Germany. I pointed 
out . . . that he himself had said to me that Germany would not con- 
sider herself forced to mobilize unless Russia mobilized upon the Ger- 
man frontier, and that such was not the case. He replied that that 
was true, but that the heads of the army insisted that all delay was a 
loss of strength to the German army. 2 

Two days later, August I, von Jagow had to tell the British 
ambassador, Sir Edward Goschen, that Germany had answered 
Russian mobilization, not with German mobilization, but with 
an ultimatum demanding that Russia demobilize, and, having 
received no answer, was about to declare war. For this decision 
he had, of course, none but a strategic explanation : 

Russia had said that her mobilization did not necessarily imply war, and 
that she could perfectly well remain mobilized for months without mak- 
ing war. This was not the case with Germany. She had the speed and 
Russia had the numbers, and the safety of the German Empire forbade 
that Germany should allow Russia time to bring up masses of troops 
from all parts of her wide dominions. 3 

On July 31, when the German government decided to de- 
mand Russian demobilization, the German Foreign Office finally 
abandoned the attempt to conduct negotiations on the tradi- 
tional diplomatic lines. On that day the British ambassador, 
acting on instructions from London, 4 asked von Jagow whether 
Germany would respect the neutrality of Belgium. The latter 
replied, according to Goschen's report, that 

1 French Yellow Book, no. 105. 2 Ibid., no. 109. 

3 British Blue Book, no. 138.^ * Ibid., no. 114. 



No. i] 



MILITARY STRATEGY VERSUS DIPLOMACY 



1\ 



he must consult the emperor and the chancellor before he could pos- 
sibly answer. I gathered from what he said that he thought any reply 
they might give could not but disclose a certain amount of their plan of 
campaign in the event of war ensuing, and he was therefore very doubt- 
ful whether they would return any answer at all. 1 

In fact no answer was given until three days later, on August 4, 
when the German troops had already crossed the Belgian 
frontier. Then von Jagow again had to explain Germany's 
action ; and again he could defend it only on strategic grounds : 

They had to advance into France by the quickest and easiest way, so as 
to be able to get well ahead with their operations and endeavor to strike 
some decisive blow as early as possible. It was a matter of life and 
death for them, as, if they had gone by the more southern route, they 
could not have hoped ... to have got through without formidable 
opposition entailing great loss of time. This loss of time would have 
meant time gained by the Russians for bringing up their troops to the 
German frontier. Rapidity of action was the great German asset, while 
that of Russia was an inexhaustible supply of troops. 2 

The conduct of Austro-German diplomacy during the critical 
period, July 23-31, is open to censure alike from the strategist 
and from the diplomatist. If for strategic reasons the " com- 
monplaces as to the responsibility of the aggressor" were to be 
disregarded, why was an ultimatum not sent to Russia earlier? 
Why not demand, as soon as Austria had declared war on 
Servia, that Russia pledge itself to keep the peace? On the 
other hand, if the diplomatic game was to be played at all, why 
not play it out? The least defensible of policies is a vacillating 
policy. 

In the present state of our information it is as difficult to say 
why conversations between Vienna and St. Petersburg were 
opened on the 30th of July as to explain why they were cut off 
at midnight on the 31st. The only theory that seems at all 
plausible is that of the French ambassador in Berlin. Writing 
on July 29, he reported that the German chancellor had promised 

1 British Blue Book, no. 122. Cf. French Yellow Book, no. 123. 

2 British Blue Book, no. 160, at page 78. 



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[Vol. XXX 



to urge upon Vienna direct negotiations with St. Petersburg, and 
he added : 

The chancellor's attitude is very probably the result of the last interview 
of Sir Edward Grey with Prince Lichnowsky [German ambassador in 
London]. Up to these very last few days people have flattered them- 
selves here that England would remain aloof, and the impression pro- 
duced by her attitude upon the German government and upon financiers 
and business men is profound. 1 

Doubt as to Great Britain's attitude might well induce the Ger- 
man General Staff itself to think twice before forcing war upon 
Russia. Whether Germany hoped to gain its " place in the 
sun " by peaceful arrangements with Great Britain, or expected 
to develop its world power on the ruins of the British Empire, 
it is inconceivable that it intended to fight Great Britain at the 
same time that it was fighting Russia and France. And until 
July 29 the German government seems to have been confident 
that Great Britain would remain neutral. On what grounds was 
this confidence based? 

When we read the official and unofficial explanations of Great 
Britain's intervention which have been advanced on the part of 
Germany since the outbreak of the war, and which aim to show 
that Great Britain had quite other reasons for intervening than 
Germany's breach of Belgian neutrality, our perplexity increases. 
When, for example, we are reminded that for centuries it has 
been Great Britain's policy to promote and support continental 
coalitions against any continental state which threatened to ob- 
tain a dominating position, especially if such a state was de- 
veloping sea power, we wonder why this fact was not taken into 
account by the German government before the outbreak of the 
present war. And when we are told that to Great Britain itself 
— to take the German chancellor's most recent explanation of 
his famous phrase — the treaty of 1839 was only " a scrap of 
paper," we wonder why, in a country justly renowned for its 
painstaking historical research, it should be forgotten that the 

1 French Yellow Book, no. 92. The same explanation of the German change of 
attitude was given by the Italian minister for foreign affairs, July 30; cf. British 
Blue Book, no. 106. 



No. i] MILITARY STRATEGY VERSUS DIPLOMACY j$ 

neutralizing of Belgium in 1839, like the creation of the king- 
dom of the Netherlands in 181 5, was chiefly promoted by 
Great Britain, for the quite intelligible purpose of preventing 
this part of the European coast line from being used as a base 
for military operations against its own territory. 

Some of the arguments which Germany addressed to Great 
Britain in order to dissuade that power from intervening to pro- 
tect France or Belgium are quite similar to those which Austria 
and Germany addressed to Russia, in order to show that Russia 
had no reason to intervene for the protection of Servia. Austria 
assured Russia that, if the war were localized, it would under- 
take to respect the integrity and to guarantee the continuance 
of the Servian state. 1 In a conversation with the British am- 
bassador on July 29, the German chancellor, after stating that 
it was clear to him " that Great Britain would never stand by and 
allow France to be crushed," proceeded to reassure the ambas- 
sador : 

That, however, was not the object at which Germany aimed. Provided 
that the neutrality of Great Britain were certain, every assurance would 
be given to the British government that the Imperial government aimed 
at no territorial acquisition at the expense of France should they prove 
victorious in any war that might ensue. 2 

In the same conversation, the German chancellor said that if, in 
consequence of the action of France, Germany should be forced 
to enter upon operations in Belgium, " Belgian integrity would 
be respected if she had not sided against Germany." In each 
case there appears to have been an assumption that such an under- 
taking would be satisfactory ; that any result of war short of an- 
i nexation would be unobjectionable. The Russian objection to 
the crushing of Servia, however, and the British objection to 
the crushing of France rested chiefly on the effect upon the 
balance of power in the Balkans and in Europe. From the 
political point of view, it is not by annexation alone that the 

1 German White Paper, Memorandum, annexes 3, 10, 10 A, 10 B; Russian Orange 
Paper, nos. 28, 35, 60; British Blue Book, nos. 47, 48, 59; French Yellow Book, 
no. 62. 

2 British Blue Book, no. 85. 



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balance of power is affected. If, as a result of war, Servia be- 
came politically dependent on Austria, or France were seriously 
weakened, the balance of power would be disturbed. The dif- 
ference would be one of degree only. Similarly as regards 
Belgium : if that country were used as a base of military opera- 
tions against France, a precedent would be created for using 
it, in a future war, as a base of operations against England. 
This peril might be greater if Belgium were annexed by Ger- 
many, but it would not be obviated by the reestablishment of 
Belgium as a nominally independent and neutralized state. 
Here again the difference would be in degree only. To the 
military man, on the other hand, the balance of power appears 
to be seriously disturbed only by annexation, because only in 
such event can the victorious state build fortresses and levy 
troops in the conquered territory. I do not mean to imply that 
military men do not recognize that the balance of power is 
affected when a country is weakened by a crushing defeat and 
loaded with a heavy war indemnity, or when it has become 
politically dependent upon the conquering power ; but the dif- 
ference between these results and outright annexation seems 
to them, I think, one of kind rather than one of degree. If 
the Austrian and German governments seriously expected these 
proffered pledges to influence the action of Russia or of Great 
Britain, the point of view which they took, and apparently as- 
sumed that Russia and Great Britain would also take, was, I 
suggest, military rather than political. 

By July 29, however, if not earlier, the Austrian and German 
governments had apparently become convinced not only that 
Russia would probably intervene but that Great Britain also 
might intervene. 1 Why then did Germany precipitate the con- 
tinental war by its ultimatum to Russia and give Great Britain 
formal cause for war by the invasion of Belgium? Partly, be- 
yond a doubt, because the greater the number of hostile powers, 
the more necessary it seemed to realize to the full the advan- 
tages of superior military preparation ; partly, also, and perhaps 

1 For British warnings, which became increasingly grave in tone, cf. British Blue 
Book, Introductory Narrative and nos. 48, 89, 101, 102, 109, ill, 123. 



No. i] MILITARY STRATEGY VERSUS DIPLOMACY 



mainly, because all along Austria and Germany had counted, in 
the case of Russia, on internal dissensions and possible foreign 
complications 1 and, in the case of Great Britain, on the immi- 
nence of civil war in Ireland 2 and the possibility of revolts 
in India, in Egypt and in South Africa. If these difficulties 
and dangers did not deter Russia or Great Britain from war, 
they would at least make it difficult for either of them to wage 
war efficiently. In case of Great Britain, the German govern- 
ment apparently hoped to the last that peril of sedition would 
prove deterrent. They could not have believed that Great 
Britain would not like to fight, but they persuaded themselves 
that it would be unable to fight. 3 They reached this conclusion, 
however, only by ignoring the fact, familiar to every student of 
history, that foreign war usually allays and often ends internal 
dissensions. Today, not only is this point appreciated in Ger- 
many, but we are told that Great Britain went to war in order 
to shelve the Irish question ! 

Upon the question whether the German government expected 
to use Belgium as a military highway into France without 
encountering Belgian resistance, or anticipated and possibly 
desired resistance, I shall not venture to express an opinion. It 
is obvious that Belgian resistance has enabled the invaders to 
use not only the territory but all the resources of this country 
in the prosecution of the war and has opened the way for its 

1 British Blue Book, nos. 32, 71; French Yellow Book, no. 35. 

2 French Yellow Book, no. 35. It will be remembered that there was armed con- 
flict, accompanied by loss of life, in Dublin, July 26. 

3 The question whether, as has been repeatedly urged, Great Britain could have 
prevented the war by placing itself from the outset unequivocally on the side of Russia 
and France lies outside the scope of this paper. To ask this question is to concede 
that the attitude of Austria and Germany was aggressive. The question raised is 
whether their aggression could have been checked by a British threat of war. The 
British government gave its reasons for not pursuing such a course during the negotia- 
tions (British Blue Book, nos. 6, 17, 24, 44, 59), and it has since more fully de- 
veloped its argument on this point (speech of Sir Edward Grey in the House of Com- 
mons, August 3; ibid., at pp. 89-91). It may, however, be suggested that if, as is 
here maintained, the German expectation of British neutrality was based, not on any 
doubt as to Great Britain's inclination to intervene, but on the belief that Great 
Britain could not intervene, or at least could not intervene effectively, it is difficult to 
see why Germany should have attached any more weight to a threat than it actually 
attached to repeated warnings. 



73 



POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY [Vol. XXX 



annexation in case of final German victory ; but to infer that, in 
view of these immediate and prospective advantages, the Ger- 
man government not only reckoned with but hoped for resist- 
ance, would be to attribute to that government intentions which 
it has not avowed and with which it should not be charged with- 
out direct evidence. If, however, Germany expected to go 
through Belgium without fighting the Belgians, this expectation 
must have rested upon the purely military consideration that 
resistance on the part of the Belgian militia was so hopeless as 
to be inconceivable. From the purely military point of view, 
even the Belgian General Staff could hardly have reached a 
different conclusion. It is of course evident that in permitting 
the passage of German troops Belgium would have ceased to be 
neutral and would have given France and Great Britain cause 
for war ; but it would have had German support against these 
countries, with a German guaranty of its territorial integrity at 
the close of the war. And in case of German defeat, France 
and Great Britain might well have recognized the excuse of 
duress, vis major. The sentiments that seem to have determined 
Belgian resistance to Germany — love of independence, fidelity 
to treaty engagements and resentment against flagrant wrong — - 
are of precisely the sort which the military mind is apt to 
undervalue. They are imponderables. 

This study of the Austro-German diplomacy seems to lead 
to fairly definite conclusions. Military, not political, opinion 
decided that war was, if not desirable, at least inevitable ; military 
strategy robbed diplomacy, not only of the time necessary to 
manceuver the adversaries into aggression, but even of oppor- 
tunity to show a decent reluctance to engage in war ; military 
strategy decided that the war must be carried at the outset 
through Belgium into France, leaving to diplomacy only the 
hopeless task of getting the German armies through Belgium 
into France without war with Great Britain. There are signs 
already that in the event of German defeat the diplomatists are 
to be made the scapegoats. That, however, will be unjust ; for 
they really had no chance. 

In assuming the control of diplomacy, military strategy ap- 
pears to have defeated its own aims. Whatever may be the 



No. i] MILITARY STRATEGY VERSUS DIPLOMACY yg 

final outcome of the war, the original plan of campaign has 
failed. Neither Servia nor France has been crushed. And 
the original plan of campaign in the west seems to have failed 
because of the unexpectedly obstinate resistance of the Bel- 
gians and the unexpectedly efficient assistance which Great 
Britain was able to give to France. The most formidable fight- 
ing machine in the world has been unable to perform the task 
imposed upon it by its leaders ; and the error in their calcula- 
tions was undervaluation of the imponderables. 

VII 

From the outbreak of the war there has been, not only in 
countries opposed to Austria and Germany, but also in neutral 
countries, and particularly in the United States, a very general 
assertion that " militarism " is responsible. There has been 
also a general assumption that German or Prussian militarism 
is a unique phenomenon; that it differs from anything re- 
sembling militarism to be found in other countries, not in de- 
gree only, but in kind. 

What do we really mean when we assert that a state is mili- 
taristic? It is clear, I think, that a state is not necessarily 
militaristic because it is prepared for war. It is not necessarily 
militaristic because it holds all its able-bodied male citizens to 
military service, as is the case in Switzerland, nor because it 
holds them to three years of training, as is the case in France, 
nor because it has a powerful navy, as is the case with the United 
States. Nor is a state militaristic because it has a large body of 
professional military officers whose duty it is to form plans for the 
conduct of w r ar, and who are apt to regard war with other feel- 
ings than those of the normal civilian. A nation is militaristic 
just in so far as the views and feelings natural and almost neces- 
sary in its army and navy are shared by its civilians, especially 
by those who are able to direct national thought and to create 
national sentiment. In a nation, as in an individual, militarism 
is a state of mind. The more fully a national mind is militarized, 
the more difficult it becomes for the political heads of the state 
to subordinate military to political considerations. They may 
even fail to give due weight to purely political considerations, 



So 



POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY [Vol. XXX 



because their own minds have been militarized. When this 
happens, the state itself has become militaristic. 

The peril that foreign policy may be controlled by con- 
siderations of military strategy is of course greatest in such 
a state. It is, however, not confined to such a state. The 
characteristics of the military mind are everywhere the same, 
and the antithesis between the military mind and the polit- 
ical mind is not only perpetual but universal. Military ap- 
preciation of the advantages of the attack will always and 
everywhere tend to rob diplomacy of the time necessary to 
accomplish its proper tasks and may direct any government into 
unwise and possibly disastrous action. And if this peril is par- 
ticularly great under personal government, it must be remem- 
bered that in monarchies and republics alike, under every 
system of government which obtains in the civilized world, the 
conduct of diplomacy is personal : it is in the hands of the chief 
executive and of the secretary or minister of foreign affairs. 
To show that Great Britain and the United States may be ex- 
posed to the same perils to which Austria and Germany suc- 
cumbed in 19 14, two illustrations must suffice. 

When in 191 2 1 the British military attache in Brussels told 
the Belgian general with whom he was conferring that, in case 
of necessity, the British government would land troops in 
Belgium without waiting for any invitation from that country, 
he neither committed the Belgian government to any such ar- 
rangement, since the Belgian general protested that Belgian 
consent was necessary, nor did he commit his own government, 
because, fortunately, he had no power to do so. He gave, 
however, a typical illustration of the incapacity of the military 
man to appreciate the importance of keeping one's country in a 
correct attitude on the face of the record. 2 

Just before the outbreak of the Spanish- American war, the 
acting secretary of our navy urged President McKinley to send 
out a fleet to meet and destroy the Spanish fleet without wait- 
ing for a formal declaration of war. 3 Here we have a classical 

1 Or 191 1 . The date seems to be uncertain. 

2 The Case of Belgium, p. 12. 

3 John D. Long, The New American Navy, p. 174. 



No. i] 



MILITARY STRATEGY VERSUS DIPLOMACY 



8l 



example of the danger that even the civilian, if charged with 
military responsibility and preoccupied with military problems, 
may leave out of his reckoning a very important imponderable 
— the opinion of civilized mankind. 

I have spoken thus far only of the dangers which a nation 
incurs by permitting its diplomacy to be controlled by strategic 
considerations. There is, however, a far broader aspect to the 
problem. Of all means which civilization has provided to avert 
war, negotiation is the most important. Direct negotiation may 
be and often is supplemented by the friendly offices of nations 
not immediately concerned and by offers of mediation; but 
these are but extensions of negotiation. Arbitration is a potent 
agency for the peaceful settlement of controversies, but arbitra- 
tion cannot be set in motion without negotiation. For negotia- 
tion time is essential. In the interest of the peace of the world, 
therefore, it is of the highest importance that the political heads 
of every state should be ever on their guard against the attempts 
of their military advisers to convince them that immediate 
attack is necessary. It is almost always declared to be a matter 
" of life or death." To the nation primarily concerned it is 
usually, in fact, only a matter of greater or less chance of 
initial success. To peace, however, it is always a matter of 
death. 

Munroe Smith. 

Addendum. — The Austro-Hungarian Red Book (not accessible until the preceding 
pages had gone to press) gives many corroborative and some illuminating data. — 
In a dispatch (no. 6) from the Austrian minister at Belgrade, July 21, we have further 
evidence that Austrian "prestige " was at stake {supra, p. 70, note 2). — On July 31, 
the Austrian ambassador at St. Petersburg reported (no. 55) that his conversations 
with the Russian foreign minister had not brought them "noticeably closer to an un- 
derstanding." If the Russian, French and British accounts of those conversations 
(supra, p. 56) are correct, the statement of the Austrian ambassador can mean only 
that on no condition would his government stay its military action against Servia, and 
that, so far as Austria was concerned, these negotiations were purely dilatory. — To 
the story of the overriding of diplomacy by military strategy at Berlin (supra, pp. 71, 
72) is now to be added the fact of pressure from Vienna. On July 28, the Austrian 
foreign minister instructed the Austrian Ambassador at Berlin to urge Germany to 
notify Russia that mobilization on its part would be answered "with the most 
extensive military counter-measures" (no. 42). — To Austro-German grounds for 
hoping that the war against Servia might be "localized" (supra, p. 70, note 1) 
should be added, it appears, a hope that Russia might be deterred by German threats; 
for, in the note just cited, the Austrian foreign minister expressed his belief that 
" plain language would be the most efficacious means " of restraining Russia. 



i R.h MB 



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